Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 6

2010

Causality and Comparative Advantage: Vietnam’s Role in the PostICA International Coffee Market
Lindsey G. Stockman
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, stock188@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer

Recommended Citation
Stockman, Lindsey G. (2010) "Causality and Comparative Advantage: Vietnam’s Role in the
Post-ICA International Coffee Market," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol6/iss1/6

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Causality and Comparative Advantage: Vietnam’s Role in the Post-ICA
International Coffee Market
Abstract
Although Vietnam comprised a miniscule portion of the international coffee market during the 1900s, its
coffee production skyrocketed after the collapse of the ICA and surpassed Colombian production levels.
This unmatched increase attributed the drastic decline in world coffee prices to the oversupply of coffee
from Vietnam. Following the methods of Dodaro (1993), a Granger causality analysis between
Vietnamese coffee exports and ICO composite price produced neither forward nor reverse causality
between these two variables. Using the methodology of Carlin, Glyn, and Van Reenen (2001), labor
productivity comparisons aimed to explain the shift of coffee export volume from Colombia to Vietnam.
Results demonstrated Colombia’s consistently higher labor productivity, thus the disparity in realized
comparative advantage does not explain the shift in production. Although Vietnam’s success in coffee
production accompanied the Colombian coffee sector’s demise, a direct link between the two economies
does not appear to exist. Vietnam’s success likely arose simply from the culmination of relevant
government policies, trade agreements, and the collapse of the ICA.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Through the consideration of historical events surrounding the
restructuring of major coffee producers, this analysis predicted the rapid increase
in Vietnamese coffee production as a significant causal factor in the recent decline
in world coffee prices. Furthermore, this analysis hypothesized that the disparity
between Vietnamese and Colombian comparative advantage is the prominent
factor supporting the transfer of coffee export volume and market control between
these two countries. The labor-intensive properties of the coffee crop suggest
labor productivity as the needed measure to determine comparative advantage in
coffee producing nations.
Following the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in
1989, the composition of the world’s coffee producers drastically shifted.
Colombia was one of the largest coffee producers in the world, second only to
Brazil; however, within ten years of the collapse, the Vietnamese coffee sector
overtook Colombia to become the second largest world producer. Throughout its
existence, the ICA imposed quotas on coffee production to artificially uphold the
world coffee price. This created a tightly regulated coffee market in which nonmembers, such as Vietnam, faced greatly limited production. After the collapse of
the ICA, the coffee market became fully competitive and open to all producers.
(Luong & Tauer, 2006) The Vietnamese government viewed this event as an
opportunity to implement market-oriented policies that promoted free and global
coffee production and competition. Vietnam’s coffee sector is widely believed to
be the main cause leading to the coffee price crisis of 2001 due to its unmatched
increase in coffee production between 1989 and 1999. (Luong & Tauer, 2006)
The following analysis focused on the coffee sectors of Colombia and
Vietnam, as well as the events connecting these two large markets. Coffee
production was relatively unimportant to the Vietnamese economy until the late
1980s (Thang & Shively, 2008), yet this small country overtook one of the largest
coffee producing nations in the world in a span of only ten years (see graph 1).
The goal of this analysis was to determine whether Vietnam deserves the causal
role in the world price decline, as well as the reasoning behind the radical shift in
coffee export volume among producing nations.
To accomplish this goal, this paper presents a Granger causality analysis
to evaluate the possible existence and direction of causality between the increased
Vietnamese coffee production and the declining world coffee prices. Furthermore,
to examine the reasoning behind the radical shift in coffee production, this paper
includes two analyses that compare labor productivity and cost competitiveness
between Colombia and Vietnam in order to examine each country’s comparative
advantage in the labor-intensive coffee sector. Specifically, the first analysis
utilizes the Classical Model to determine which country should dominate the
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export market based on the relationship between each country’s labor productivity
and wage rate. Whereas, the second model analyzes each country’s cost
competitiveness in the coffee sector by examining the role of relative unit labor
costs in determining its export market share. These two theories present different
ways to determine the importance of labor productivity and comparative
advantage in the reallocation of coffee export volume to the more productive
country, which in this case is predicted to be Vietnam. The disparity in labor
productivity between these countries would not be fully realized until the 1990s
when the coffee market was deregulated, thus marking the importance of the
collapse of the ICA in the vast reordering of producers in the international coffee
market.
This paper begins by presenting the historical background of the
International Coffee Agreement, as well as the history of the Colombian and
Vietnamese coffee sectors. The next section will present the motivation and
methodology behind each analysis and is followed by a section of computations.
The following section will present results and implications for each analysis, and
lastly, there is a section of overall conclusions.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT
The international coffee market remained free of interventions before
1900, but many coffee producing nations were experiencing detrimental economic
impacts from the persistent fluctuation of coffee prices. These negative impacts
provided incentives to intervene in the international coffee market in order to
sustain the world coffee price. The Brazilian Federal Government implemented
the first market intervention in 1921 by preventing the export of large stocks of
coffee. This policy lasted until 1940, when after destroying 78 million bags of
stored coffee in a span of thirteen years, Brazil dropped this costly policy and
increased its exports to regain 63% of the world coffee market. Many Latin
American countries, such as Colombia, directly benefited from Brazil’s reduced
exports, thus they had little incentive to participate in an export reduction
agreement. However, when the European countries banned all coffee imports
during World War II, the negative impacts of low prices reverberated through all
Latin American markets, thus initiating the producers’ interest in international
market regulations. (Pieterse & Silvis, 1988)
After a series of failed producer-based price regulation agreements, the
first International Coffee Agreement was signed in September 1963, including
both coffee producing nations and the United States on the coffee consumer side.
This agreement distributed export quotas to 36 producing nations based on their
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average exportable production in the previous four years and the application of a
plan to reduce future production. Although well-intentioned, a policy allowing
members to surpass production quotas by exporting coffee to countries that were
not typically large coffee importers created a major loophole in this agreement
that resulted in inadequacies in the regulation of coffee export volume and
eventually led to the reevaluation of this ICA. The next ICA, signed in 1968,
included several provisions holding members accountable for obeying the quota
system. This ICA faced its demise in 1972 when the United States withdrew from
the agreement after producers attempted to form a cartel to counteract the
negative trend of export price that was caused by the depreciation of the dollar
(the unit of denomination for coffee prices) against other major currencies.
(Pieterse & Silvis, 1988)
The next ICA was negotiated in 1976 and implemented quota restrictions
only when the coffee prices fell below a certain level. This quota system was
quickly rendered useless when unexpected situations in three major coffee
producing nations allowed other nations to increase production past their quota
limits in order to fill the coffee shortage. (Pieterse & Silvis, 1988)
The most recent ICA, signed in 1983, covered 99% of the world coffee
exports and utilized export restrictions to stabilize world market prices. The ICA’s
reign severely limited the coffee exports from small non-member producers, such
as Vietnam, since all coffee demand was met through the ICA controlled exports.
The ICA provided member countries, such as Colombia, with appropriate coffee
import demand at artificially created higher world prices. Under this ICA, the
composite indicator price (CIP) was the main determining factor in the
implementation of the quota system. When the 15-day moving average of the CIP
moved out of the stabilization range of 1.20-1.40 US dollars per pound for a
certain number of days, the quotas were automatically adjusted by fixed
percentages depending upon how far out of the range the CIP had gone. (Pieterse
& Silvis, 1988)
Although many experts agree on the effectiveness of the ICA price band,
the ICA’s underlying problems of free riding and quarreling over export quotas
outweighed the benefits of the higher price. During the final ICA, low-priced
trade with non-member countries progressively increased, thus fragmenting the
market between the countries that followed their quotas and those that did not.
Importing countries further undermined the principles of the ICA by seeking out
cheaper coffee to fulfill excess demand during the lag before the stable ICA
quotas could be adjusted. These and other problems culminated at such a level
where the ICA was no longer feasible, thus it was allowed to collapse in 1989.
(Ponte, 2001)
After the collapse of the ICA, the world coffee price exhibited a new
pattern of lower prices with much higher variability (see graph 2; Ponte, 2001).
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Although lower prices are typical after the collapse of a price-fixing scheme, the
unanticipated high variability stemmed from the sudden loss of government
involvement in coffee producing countries. During the reign of the ICA, many
producing nations had high government involvement in their coffee sectors due to
the countries’ heavy reliance on coffee exports as a main source of revenue.
Along with the lack of government involvement, the instability of the coffee
sector was exacerbated by the inability of many smaller grower organizations to
effectively control the volume of coffee exports. This resulted in higher
concentration of the coffee market since only the livelihoods of large growers
could be sustained under the low coffee prices. Furthermore, the increased
concentration directed more of the coffee income to remain in consuming
countries while the producers received progressively smaller proportions of the
income. (Ponte, 2001) During the height of this inopportune environment,
Vietnam unexpectedly increased its coffee production to become one of the major
coffee producers in the world.
2.2 THE COLOMBIAN COFFEE SECTOR
Jesuit missionaries planted the first coffee plants in Colombia in 1732 (De
Graaff, 1986). Colombia had ideal growing conditions for this cash crop due to its
vast deposits of volcanic soil, mild temperatures, and abundant rainfall (Juan
Valdez, 2008). Coffee production remained at fairly low levels in Colombia until
a law was passed in 1821 that banned all coffee imports (De Graaff, 1986).
Through this legislation, the Colombian government firmly established its
prominent and lengthy role in coffee trade decisions.
Although Colombia was the second largest world coffee producer for
several decades, this coffee industry experienced several booms and busts
throughout its development. The first Colombian coffee price crisis occurred
during the 1920s, yet this crisis was quickly overcome when Brazil opted to
withhold exports from the market in an effort to force the coffee prices to rise.
Colombia utilized Brazil’s policy as an opportunity to expand its share of the
coffee market and tripled its planted area and exports during this period of
Brazilian price fixing. During the next bust in the coffee industry, Colombia
joined many other coffee producing nations to form a quota system that ensured a
higher price of coffee in the world market. Similar to the previous price crisis, this
negative price trend reversed shortly after the conclusion of World War II, and by
1954 coffee comprised 83% of total exports from Colombia. (De Graaff, 1986)
Although Colombia’s dependence on coffee fluctuated over time, the
implementation of advancing technology allowed Colombia to produce higher
yields on the same plots of land. This discovery resulted in the furthering of
Colombia’s dependence on coffee export revenue. The last major increase in
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cultivated coffee area occurred between 1975 and 1978 and resulted in an
oversupply in the domestic economy given that the production level exceeded
Colombia’s allotted export quota. (De Graaff, 1986)
The Colombian coffee sector was unique from many other large coffee
producing nations in that the government did not personally oversee the coffee
sector; rather, it delegated all responsibility to a private non-profit entity called
the National Federation of Coffee Growers (Federacafe). This non-profit entity,
established in 1927, monitored and controlled the coffee sector through
government contracts (De Graaff, 1986). Federacafe created the National Coffee
Fund, which received revenues from coffee taxes and employed them to benefit
the coffee farmers and develop the Colombian coffee industry. The Coffee Fund
also protected compliant growers through a domestic minimum price, which
assisted in the stabilization of farmer incomes despite any fluctuations in the
world coffee price. (Juan Valdez, 2008) The effects of the post-ICA coffee crisis
were felt across Colombia when the National Coffee Fund terminated this price
stabilization, thus allowing the volatility in the internal market to increase and
match the price volatility in the world market. (Giovannucci, 2002)
The extensive direct and indirect government involvement in the
Colombian coffee industry positioned the sector to face drastic changes in the
structure of production and farmer involvement upon the retraction of government
and other price assistance. During the reign of the ICA, coffee was produced on
more than 300,000 farms ranging in size from 1 hectare to 100 hectares, yet more
than 50% of the national coffee was produced on medium or large farms. Near the
time of the ICA collapse, Colombian coffee officials promoted the cultivation of a
new variety of higher-yielding coffee tree. Despite the good intentions of this
policy, the tightening export quotas coupled with increasing coffee yields led to
an oversupply of coffee in the domestic market. (De Graaff, 1986)
In late 1989, the ICA collapsed, and its accompanying quota system was
no longer relevant. This collapse encouraged coffee producing nations, including
Colombia, to simultaneously export tremendous amounts of coffee on the world
market. After the collapse of the National Coffee Fund and the ICA, the large
growing organizations disappeared and the composition of producers shifted such
that the majority of coffee trees were cultivated by over 500,000 independent
coffee growers on small farms (Juan Valdez, 2008). The newly open world coffee
market removed Colombia’s previous advantage of providing high volumes of
steady high-quality coffee in favor of newer countries that produced adequatequality coffees at lower prices. These countries attracted significant portions of
Colombia’s market in commercial blends, thus demonstrating that the Colombian
coffee industry did not have the competitive advantage in producing this lower
cost coffee, but rather in the production of a variety of high-quality coffee beans
(Giovannucci, 2002).
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The negative impact of the removal of all protectionist measures became
reality when the government began to promote crop diversification away from
coffee. Following this promotion, coffee producers progressed toward on-farm
diversification, thus demonstrating that both the government and the producers
realized their lack of competitive advantage in an open market despite Colombia’s
position as the second largest world coffee producer. Although the Colombian
government encouraged diversification through financial policies and sector
programs, these incentives led to the production of inefficient crops instead of
other cash crops that could ease the country’s dependence upon coffee exports.
(Giovannucci, 2002) Only ten years after the collapse of the ICA and prior to the
termination of the National Coffee Fund, Colombia unexpectedly dropped in
rankings of the world’s largest coffee producers, and became third to the
previously insignificant Vietnam and Brazil (see graph 1).
2.3 THE VIETNAMESE COFFEE SECTOR
Although coffee was not an important export commodity in Vietnam until
the 1990s, the original coffee cultivation in Indochina began in the early 19th
century and was organized by missionaries (Robequain, 1939, as cited in
Doutriaux, Gesiler, & Shivley, 2008). Throughout French colonial rule in
Vietnam, coffee production occurred mainly on plantations as the French strongly
encouraged the cultivation of coffee for export. Relative to lowland rice, the
prominent export of the time, coffee cultivation proved to be more difficult than
anticipated, which severely limited the expansion of coffee production.
(Doutriaux et al., 2008) The majority of the original coffee trees in Vietnam were
of the Arabica variety; however, the Hemileia vastatrix attacked the Arabica
plants and depleted the output from 64.5% in 1945 to 1.7% in 1957 (Teulieres,
1961, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). The only coffee to survive this disease
was the Robusta variety, Canephora, which is the type of coffee currently
produced in Vietnam. After this disease eliminated nearly all of the coffee plants
in Vietnam, the French colonial administration rescinded their encouragement of
coffee cultivation and instead suggested that its inhabitants concentrate on annual
crops such as rice (Doutriaux et al., 2008).
After the end of French colonial rule in 1954, the new government in
Vietnam began to again encourage coffee cultivation. In the late 1970s, the
government provided incentives of clear and fertile land to induce the ethnic
majority to migrate to the less populated highland region and produce coffee.
(Doutriaux et al., 2008) This policy proved to be successful as seen in the increase
in population density in the highlands from 3 persons per square kilometer in
1940 to 77 persons per square kilometer in 1997 (Doutriaux et al., 2008).
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Through government encouragement, the cultivation of coffee transitioned
from large plantations to large state owned farms and finally to small farmers with
an average farm size of 1.2 hectares (Thanh & Shivley, 2008). Accompanying this
shift toward small-plot land ownership, the Vietnamese government progressed
toward a market-based economy, which in turn stimulated an exponential increase
in coffee cultivation area and output (Doutriaux et al., 2008). The new marketbased economy and the increasing price of coffee on the world market attracted
many new farmers to the Vietnamese highlands in the 1980s (see graph 2), thus
increasing the number of planted coffee trees and the amount of output in the
early 1990s. Between 1986 and 1996, coffee cultivation areas grew at the rate of
21% annually, and yields grew 6% annually (Minot, 1998, as cited in Doutriaux et
al., 2008). By the late 1990s, between 85% and 90% of the planted coffee area
was cultivated by small farmers (Luong & Tauer, 2006), thus exemplifying the
success of the Vietnamese government policies in transitioning from large stateowned farms to small market-based producers.
The collapse of the ICA’s quota system further contributed to the
increased coffee cultivation by removing all barriers on Vietnamese coffee
exports and allowing the exportation of an unrestricted volume of coffee on the
world market. Vietnam took full advantage of this favorable environment and by
the late 1990s, coffee accounted for 6-12% of the total value of Vietnamese
exports (see graph 3; Minot, 1998, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). Vietnam’s
dependence on coffee exports became evident early after the ICA collapse, when
Vietnamese GDP increased at an average of 7.7% per year during the period
between 1991 and 2001, Vietnam’s most prominent coffee exporting years
(World Bank, 2002, as cited in Doutriaux et al., 2008). Although this increase in
GDP was not a direct result of coffee exports, it is clear that Vietnam was
becoming progressively dependent upon coffee as a main source of revenue as
seen in the concurrent increase in GDP and coffee exports.
Accompanying the shift to a market-based coffee sector, the collapse of
the ICA contributed the final factors necessary for Vietnam to experience the full
economic impact of coffee cultivation. Prior to 1989, Vietnam’s market share was
1.2% of the world coffee market. Only ten years after the collapse, the market
share jumped to 12.4%, which made Vietnam one of the largest world coffee
producers second only to Brazil. Coffee exports comprised the majority of
Vietnam’s commodity exports at this time. (Luong & Tauer, 2006) The
simultaneous government adoption of market oriented policies and the collapse of
the ICA placed Vietnam in the prime position to expand the area under coffee
cultivation, thus resulting in unprecedented increases in the output of Vietnamese
coffee.
From their entry and exit analysis, Luong and Tauer (2006) argued that
between 1994 and 1999, Robusta coffee prices remained consistently above the
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entry level price, which motivated Vietnamese producers to increase production.
This new production resulted in an annual increase of 59% in planted area from
1995 to 2000, which occurred during the drastic decline in ICO composite price
(see graph 2). The consistently increasing production area in Vietnam during the
period of dropping ICO price provided ammunition to blame Vietnam for the
drastic and continuous decline in world coffee prices. In the same analysis, Luong
and Tauer (2006) also argued that the Robusta price fell back toward the exit level
price during the years of 2000 to 2002, which theoretically should induce
Vietnamese producers to decrease the planting area. Yet, the Vietnamese
increased their production area by 3,400 hectares in 2001. The constant growth in
Vietnamese cultivation area even during theoretically unprofitable periods
provides further support for previous ICA members when they attribute the cause
of the dropping world coffee prices in the 1990s and early 2000s to Vietnam.
Vietnam’s unexpected surge in coffee production, despite the existence of
coffee in Vietnam for nearly two hundred years prior, indicates that the country
must have held desirable coffee producing attributes that were not initially
realized due to the limitations of market interventions. Although the altered
government policy and the collapsed ICA contributed to the increase in
production, Vietnam’s economy needed to possess the appropriate coffee
characteristics in order to effectively take advantage of these events. Luong and
Tauer (2006) described coffee as a labor-intensive crop because it involves the
constant attention of labor forces throughout the year for different production
stages, thus a large supply of labor is the main necessity in coffee cultivation.
Vietnam had a large population in the late 1980s (63,263,000 people in 1988)
which was readily available to migrate to the highlands at the suggestion of the
government (The World Bank Group, 2006). These two conditions suggest that
Vietnam may have had higher labor productivity than other coffee producing
nations, which would give this country a wide advantage with this labor-intensive
crop.
3. MOTIVATION AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 MOTIVATION
The drastic changes in Vietnamese coffee production throughout the
1990s contributed to a significantly higher volume of coffee exports in the
international market. Vietnamese coffee production historically comprised a
relatively constant and small proportion of the world coffee market - 0.041% in
1965 and 0.055% in 1984 - (FAO, 2008), thus minimizing the country’s impact
on market price fluctuations (see graph 4). However, after the collapse of the
International Coffee Agreement in 1989, Vietnamese coffee production
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skyrocketed to surpass Colombia’s export volume (see graph 1). Coffee
producing nations have often blamed Vietnam for causing the recent coffee price
crisis due to the fact that Vietnam was the only country to exhibit rapid increases
in export volume after the ICA collapse (see graph 5).
Although Vietnam is often viewed as a causal factor in the world coffee
crisis, a causal analysis to determine Vietnam’s true role has not been performed.
The current paper conducted a Granger causality analysis to explore a potential
causal relationship between the increase in Vietnamese coffee production and the
decline in world coffee price (measured by the ICO composite price). The
analysis included both forward and reverse causality.
General microeconomics predicts the existence of forward causality,
where an increase in supply leads to a reduction in price through the shifting of
the supply curve along the demand curve (see graph 6). The coffee market is a
mature market - the demand and consumption levels are relatively stable - and in
this state coffee demand only changes under a significant increase in price (Ponte,
2001). According to simple microeconomics, when the supply curve shifts to the
right, it will move along the demand curve and the price will decrease due to
relatively inelastic demand (see graph 6). Reverse causality posits that the
decrease in world coffee price causes an increase in Vietnamese coffee
production. Although this is an illogical pattern since a decrease in price does not
typically encourage production due to the decrease in potential profits, Vietnam’s
unique coffee export pattern provides motivation to test causality in both
directions.
The increase in Vietnamese coffee production occurred after the collapse
of the ICA in 1989, thus it is highly probable that the increase in production was a
direct result of this collapse. Economic theories suggest that the disbanding of a
price stabilizing mechanism, such as the ICA, negatively impacts member
countries while non-member countries, like Vietnam, accumulate the benefits.
The temporal proximity of the collapse and the increased Vietnamese coffee
production complicates the ideal of placing causal blame on Vietnam for the
plummeting world coffee prices. The fact that Vietnam was the only country to
drastically increase its export volume after the collapse suggests the existence of
another factor, such as comparative advantage, that assisted Vietnam in boosting
its export volume at the expense of other nations.
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory suggests that a country should
specialize in the production of goods and services that it can produce relatively
most efficiently in order to maximize the gains from trade (Appleyard, Field, &
Cobb, 2008). Labor productivity is often calculated to measure comparative
advantage in a labor-intensive industry, such as the coffee sector. Following the
Ricardian theory, if Vietnam had a comparative advantage in the production of
coffee compared to all other goods, then under free trade, the production among
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countries would adjust to allow Vietnam to specialize in coffee production. This
adjustment would occur because, under this assumption, Vietnam would be able
to produce coffee relatively more efficiently than its trade partner in autarky, thus
increasing its partner’s desire to trade with Vietnam (see graph 7). The
hypothesized difference in comparative advantage between Colombia and
Vietnam in graph 7 implies higher labor productivity in Vietnam, which would
explain Vietnam’s increased coffee exports after the realization of free trade.
3.2 THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
The Granger causality test implemented in this analysis was adopted from
a previous study that examined the causality between export growth and GDP
growth (Dodaro, 1993), which in turn acquired the methodology from Granger
(1969). The equations presented in the paper are as follows:
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2
GXt = β + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2
GXt = β + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2

(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
(2b)

where GXt = (Xt - Xt-1) / Xt-1 , GYt = (Yt – Yt-1) / Yt-1, and t = time. The
corresponding measures of X and Y will be reassigned in the next section such
that they are relevant to this analysis. The coefficients of these equations were
calculated using an OLS regression with robust standard errors. In each case, the
dependent variable is regressed against the past values of itself and the other
variable. Similar to Dodaro (1993), this analysis specifies a two-year lag in each
variable to allow a long enough period for a causal relationship to develop
without losing too many degrees of freedom in the hypothesis testing.
Specifically, this analysis estimated equations (1b) and (2b) using an OLS
regression to determine if a causal relationship exists between the two variables.
The Granger causality analysis utilized hypothesis tests to test for joint
significance of the one and two year lagged versions of the posited causal
regressors. Specifically, when testing causality from X to Y, the hypothesis test
examines the joint significance of the two lagged versions of X, and vice versa.
Each type of causality – forward and reverse – has a specific regression model
and thus requires a separate hypothesis test. The first scenario, equation (1b),
presents a test to examine the causal relationship running from X to Y. In this
case, letting Z1 = b1 + b2, with the null hypothesis, H0: Z1 = 0, one can use a t-test
to explore the joint significance of b1 and b2.
If Z1 is positive and significant, then H0 can be rejected, implying that the
growth in X causes the growth in Y. Similarly, if Z1 is negative and significant,
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one can again reject H0, indicating that the growth in X hampers the growth in Y.
The negative association implies that the two variables move in opposite
directions through the causal relationship. In the current analysis, if X represented
Vietnamese coffee exports and Y represented ICO composite price, then a
negative Z1 portrays that an increased growth in the supply of Vietnamese coffee
exports causes a decrease in the growth of ICO composite price.
Alternatively, in the second scenario, equation (2b), the regression model
tests for a causal relationship running from Y to X. In this case, letting Z2 = d1 +
d2, and creating the null hypothesis, H0: Z2 = 0, one can perform a t-test to explore
the joint significance of d1 and d2. Similar to the previous interpretations, if Z2 is
positive and significant, then H0 can be rejected, indicating a positive relationship
in the form of Y causing X. Moreover, if Z2 is significant and negative, one can
reject the H0, indicating a negative relationship in the form of Y causing X. In this
analysis, with the values of X and Y as described above, a negative Z2 portrays
that the decreased growth in ICO composite price leads to an increase in the
growth of the supply of Vietnamese coffee exports.
Following Dodaro (1993), if both null hypotheses are rejected, there is a
causal feedback system between the two variables. In the fourth scenario, neither
null hypothesis can be rejected due to insignificant values of Z1 and Z2, thus no
causal relationship is assumed to exist between these two variables.
Although Dodaro (1993) utilized an F-test in both hypothesis tests, the
current analysis employed the t-test to test for joint significance of the one and
two year lagged versions of the predicted causal regressor. In this case of testing
for joint significance, the two variables – either b1 and b2 or d1 and d2 – can be
treated as one variable, thus the results of the t-test and the F-test will be identical.
Joint significance of these two variables indicates that the dependent variable has
a causal relationship with the independent variables in the regression. The
formulas used to compute the t-statistics in each scenario are detailed as follows:
For the first null hypothesis, H0: Z1 = b1 + b2 = 0:
(b + b ) − 0
t= 1 2
where se(b1 + b2 ) = Var(b1 + b2 )
se(b1 + b2 )

Var(b1 + b2 ) = Var(b1 ) + 2cov(b1,b2 ) + Var(b2 )

(3a) and
(4a)

Similarly, for the second null hypothesis, H0: Z2 = d1 + d2 = 0:
(d + d2 ) − 0
t= 1
where se(d1 + d2 ) = Var(d1 + d2 ) (3b) and
se(d1 + d2 )

Var(d1 + d2 ) = Var(d1 ) + 2cov(d1,d2 ) + Var(d2 )
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If the resulting t-statistics have an absolute value greater than the corresponding
two-sided critical value for the t-distribution with the appropriate degrees of
freedom, the null hypothesis can be rejected and Z1 or Z2 would be considered
significant.
3.3 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISONS
Due to the variety in types of labor, the measure of labor productivity is a
vague concept. Depending upon the source and availability of data, there are
several suggested ways to measure this value, such as: Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) per worker, output per worker, and value added to GDP per worker (Carlin,
Glyn, & Van Reenen, 2001; Ferreira & Rossi, 2003; International Labor
Organization [ILO], 2009). The concept of ‘per worker’ represents the total labor
force employed in the specific industry for which the labor productivity
calculations are completed. (Carlin et al., 2001)
Data on the output per worker is unavailable in the coffee sectors of
Colombia and Vietnam due to the fact that small farmers and their families
conduct most of the coffee cultivation in both countries. These farmers do not
have the resources needed to obtain an accurate measurement of the total number
of workers in the field per day. To further complicate the availability of this data,
migrant workers who travel around South America and work in temporary
positions harvest much of the coffee in Colombia (De Graaff, 1986). It is unlikely
that the Colombian government is able to gather accurate statistics on the number
of people employed in the coffee sector in a given year since the majority of these
employees will have moved onto employment opportunities in other countries or
sectors. In Vietnam, the government strongly encouraged coffee production in the
late 1970s by providing incentives to citizens who agreed to migrate to the
highlands and produce coffee. Although the availability of coffee output data is
still minimal, the calculation of the number of workers employed in Vietnamese
coffee production is likely to be more accurate than in Columbia due to the
government’s role in the recent initiation of coffee production. Vietnamese coffee
production, contrary to the Colombian coffee sector, has not historically
employed migrant labor during the harvest season.
Due to the limited availability of data for both the Vietnamese and
Colombian coffee sectors, many of the measures used in the labor productivity
and cost competitiveness calculations may not be completely accurate for either
nation. Thus, proxies are utilized in the following analysis in place of the
unreliable data. These proxies are described in detail in the following section.
Utilizing the methods presented in Carlin et al., (2001), this research
included the following two analyses: labor productivity and the examination of
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cost competitiveness’ role in determining the export market share. Labor
productivity for each country is defined as the division of value added in the
coffee industry at constant 2000 US$ by the total employment in the coffee
industry (Carlin et al., 2001).
Value added at constant 2000 US$

Labor Productivity =

__________________________________________________

(5)

Total Employment
The labor productivity of Vietnam and Colombia are graphically presented by
plotting labor productivity against the year. This visual representation facilitates a
comparison of the labor productivity trends over time for both countries.
Moreover, this analysis includes an examination of the annual growth in labor
productivity for each country. According to Ferreira and Rossi (2003), positive
growth in labor productivity results from a reallocation of output to the more
productive firm. Thus, in this case, positive growth would indicate that coffee
production had been reallocated to the more productive country.
In addition to this simple graphical comparison of labor productivity, the
analysis followed the methods of MacDougall (1951) as presented in Appleyard
et al. (2008) and utilized the Classical Model to predict which country should
dominate the export market based on wages and labor productivity. Specifically, a
nation should be more competitive in the world market when it has higher labor
productivity relative to another nation, after accounting for the differences in
wage rate. Applying MacDougall’s (1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008)
methodology to this analysis requires the following inequality:
Labor ProductivityVietnam
____________________________________
Labor ProductivityColombia

>

wVietnam
_____________

(6)

wColombia

Where w = wage. It is important to take the wage rate into account in this
inequality due to the fact that wage rates vary greatly between nations, thus
making it impossible to determine market dominance based solely on labor
productivity. Following MacDougall’s (1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008)
results, if this inequality holds, Vietnam should dominate the coffee export
market. If this inequality is reversed, Colombia should dominate the export
market.
3.4 COST COMPETITIVENESS
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According to Carlin et al. (2001), examining the role of cost
competitiveness in the determination of export market share requires two
components: a measure of export market share and a measure of competitiveness relative unit labor costs. Export market share (XMS) represents the proportion
that each country holds of the world coffee export market. This is calculated by
dividing each country’s exports in current US dollars by the dollar sum of world
exports.
countryj’s exports in current US$
__________________________________________
XMSj =
j = Colombia, Vietnam (7)
dollar sum of world exports
Although Carlin et al. (2001) applied this formula to several different industries
within one country, the XMS value strictly measured the coffee export market
share of Colombia and Vietnam (XMSCol and XMSViet, respectively) in the present
analysis.
According to Carlin et al. (2001), competitiveness is typically measured
either by export prices or unit labor costs. The unit labor cost methodology is
applied in this analysis due to the lack of coffee export price series data for either
country. The relative unit labor cost (RULC) is a weighted average of the unit
labor costs (ULC) in each country. In order to calculate RULC, data on employee
compensation, employment, real output, and trade is needed. Specifically, the
calculation of ULC is as follows:
ULCj = (Wj / Ej)*(ejQj / Nj)

(8)

Where W = employee compensation, E = number of employees, e = dollar
exchange rate (national currency/US$), Q = volume of output (value added at
constant prices), N = employment, and j = country. The RULC values are
computed by dividing ULCj by a weighted average of the unit labor costs for both
countries in the sample. Following the approach given by Carlin et al. (2001), the
weighting factor is XMSj in 1995, thus the specific calculation is:
RULCj =

ULCj
_________________________________________________________

(9)

[XMSViet,1995*ULCViet + XMSCol,1995*ULCCol]
The year 1995 was chosen as the weighting factor because it more accurately
represents Vietnam’s unhindered share of the coffee market. The data prior to
1990 is biased toward Colombia since Vietnam’s exports were highly restricted
by the policies of the ICA during this period.
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These two calculations provide the necessary components of the cost
competitiveness analysis. In order to examine the role of cost competitiveness in
determining the export market share, one must regress RULC on XMS using the
following econometric model:
log(XMSjt) = Σ αk log(RULC)jt-k + vjt where k = 0, 1, …, L is a lag factor

(10)

Although Carlin et al. (2001) utilized a five-year lag period, a two-year lag was
chosen for the present analysis due to the limited number of data points and to
maintain consistency with the lag time imposed in the Granger causality analysis.
The specified models used in each analysis are presented in Appendices F and G.
According to Carlin et al. (2001), the exogeneity of RULC can be assumed, thus
an OLS regression was conducted in this analysis. The coefficients of this log-log
econometric model represent elasticities of the dependent variable (XMS) with
respect to each parameter (RULCj,0, RULCj,1, or RULCj,2). This model
specification is used frequently in this type of analysis since it creates a constant
elasticity. Moreover, if the estimated alpha values are negative, the model exhibits
the expected negative effects of cost on export market share in the long run.
(Carlin et al., 2001)
4. COMPUTATIONS

4.1 PREPARING THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
Prior to conducting the Granger Causality analysis, it is necessary to
designate the measure to which each variable corresponds. In the current analysis,
X represents the real price in 2000 of Vietnamese Coffee Exports and Y
represents the ICO composite price. The Granger causality analysis examines the
causal relationship between the growth of two variables, therefore it is necessary
to compute the annual change in X and Y using the following equations: GXt =
(Xt – Xt-1) / Xt-1 and GYt = (Yt – Yt-1) / Yt-1. If the estimated regression coefficients
are significant, the growth in the explanatory variable influences the magnitude
and direction of the growth of the dependent variable. The data for the ICO
composite price was obtained from the “Historical Data” section of the
International Coffee Organization’s website (International Coffee Organization
[ICO], 2008). The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) provided publicly available data on the annual export volume and price per
good per nation. The Vietnamese coffee export data was taken from the FAO
statistics department’s website (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations [FAOSTAT], 2008).
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This analysis used the statistical software, STATA, in all regressions and
calculations of the variance and covariance needed in order to conduct the
hypothesis tests. The lagged variables were created by applying the growth
equations given above (see appendix A.1 for full data sets).
4.2 APPLICATION OF THE GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
The first regression examined forward causality, testing whether the
increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decrease in the ICO
composite price. The specific equation utilized in this regression is equation (1b),
where X = Vietnamese coffee exports and Y = ICO Composite price. A
significant negative value of Z1 would confirm the original hypothesis, which
claimed that the increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the rapid
decline in ICO composite price. Appendix A presents the results of the STATA
regressions and the corresponding t-test. As can be seen in this appendix, the tstatistic, t = -0.8212 is not significant when compared to the two-sided critical
value, t32,.05= ± 1.6939.
The second regression examined reverse causality, testing whether
changes in ICO composite price caused the changes in Vietnamese coffee
production. The original hypothesis did not predict any significant results in the
reverse causality direction. If a significant test statistic was found, a negative
value of Z2 would indicate that the decrease in ICO composite price caused the
increase in Vietnamese coffee production. Appendix B presents the results of the
STATA regressions and the corresponding t-test. The t-statistic presented in this
appendix, t = .0046, is also not significant when compared to the two-sided
critical value, t32,.05 = ±1.6939.
4.3 APPLICATION OF THE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISONS
The variables needed to precisely apply the labor productivity formula
presented in the methodology section - the value added of coffee in constant US
dollars and total employment in the coffee sector - are unavailable in both the
Vietnamese and Colombian coffee sectors. The most specified form of agriculture
value added is one step past the first ISIC classification, where agriculture was
extracted from the ISIC’s ‘A’ classification, which represents agriculture, hunting,
forestry, and fishing (ILO, 2008). In this analysis, Agriculture Value Added to
GDP was used as a proxy for the coffee value added to GDP since the agriculture
revenue of both countries relies heavily on coffee exports (see graph 8a and 8b).
Similarly, the total employment in the coffee sector is an unknown value due to a
lack of resources that are needed in order to accumulate this data. The World
Bank World Development Indicators (2006) includes a measure of Agriculture
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Value Added (in constant 2000US$), as well as a measure of Agriculture Value
Added per worker (in constant 2000 US$). This second variable is used as a proxy
for labor productivity because among the available data it most accurately
represents the value added per coffee worker in constant prices for each country.
This labor productivity data and its graphical representation are presented in
Appendices D.1 and D.2.
Another important measure to examine is the annual growth in labor
productivity. This measure is simply calculated by finding the percent difference
in labor productivity between consecutive years for each country. These results
are presented in Appendix D.4.
4.4 APPLICATION OF THE CLASSICAL MODEL
The application of the Classical Model, as presented in MacDougall
(1951, as cited in Appleyard et al., 2008, p. 53-57), required only two variables
per country: labor productivity and wage per worker. The labor productivity
measure for this analysis utilized the same proxy as given above, the World
Bank’s (2006) Agriculture Value Added per worker. The coffee sector wage is
calculated using the data on Price Paid to Producers from the ICO website (2008).
This second measure is a representative proxy given that the majority of coffee is
produced and harvested by small landowners in both countries. The results of this
application are presented in Appendix E.
4.5 APPLICATION OF THE COST COMPETITIVENESS ANALYSIS
Several of the variables used in the calculation of RULC required the use
of a proxy due to unavailable or unreliable data. In the calculation of ULC,
employee compensation and number of employees (W/E) were jointly
approximated using the International Coffee Organization’s (ICO) measure of
Prices Paid to Producers (ICO, 2008). The ICO’s data provided an accurate
representation of the revenue producers receive for the production of coffee. This
price varies between countries and type of coffee produced, Arabica or Robusta,
thus it is not the same for Vietnam and Colombia. The other portion of the ULC
is calculated by dividing the exchange rate and value added by the employment in
that sector (eQ/N). This measure is the same as the labor productivity calculation
described above, thus (eQ/N) is approximated by the World Bank’s (2006)
Agriculture Value Added per worker in constant 2000 US$. Appendix F presents
the calculations of ULC for Vietnam and Appendix G presents the calculations for
Colombia.
The XMS component of RULC did not require a proxy in these
calculations. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations
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provides data on country specific and worldwide export commodities in terms of
1,000 US$ and tonnes (FAO, 2008). The XMS values in Appendices F and G
represent each country’s actual share of the world coffee export market. Although
this is the only component of RULC without a proxy, it is important to avoid
approximating this value since the examination of the temporal trends in each
country’s export share is the main focus of this research. The major share that
coffee comprises of each country’s agriculture market supports the use of the
approximations described above in conjunction with the true values of XMS (see
graphs 8a and 8b). Appendices F.1 and G.1 include the final calculations of
RULC using this combination of true and approximated variables.
The STATA output from the OLS regressions of the two-year lagged
econometric models is provided in Appendices F.2 and G.2. In order to test for
the significance of relative unit labor costs in determining the export market
share, an F-test was conducted for each country. This specific F-test explores the
significance of the model by determining if at least one of the parameters has a
coefficient that is significantly different than zero. The output in Appendix F.2
demonstrates that relative unit labor costs are a significant determinant in export
market share for Vietnam (F-stat =3.60, p = 0.0406, R2=0.4358) at the 0.05
significance level, but not for Colombia (F-stat = 0.31, p=0.8175, R2=0.0624; see
Appendix G.2).
5. RESULTS

The inability to reject either null hypothesis in the causality analysis
demonstrates that there is no causal link between these two variables. Although
contrary to the original prediction, there is not enough evidence to blame the
coffee price crisis on the Vietnamese government policies that promoted the rapid
development of coffee production in Vietnam’s Central Highlands. According to
the labor productivity analysis, Colombia has consistently higher labor
productivity than Vietnam. This productivity remained higher in the years after
the ICA collapse, which was the first time that Vietnam’s coffee comparative
advantage could be realized. The Classical Model analysis claims that Colombia
should dominate the coffee export market. However, the cost competitiveness
model suggests that Vietnam’s export market share has a negative association
with its relative unit labor costs.
5.1 DID THE INCREASE IN VIETNAMESE COFFEE PRODUCTION LEAD TO A DECREASE
IN WORLD COFFEE PRICES?
The results suggest that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the
increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decrease in world coffee
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prices (see Appendix A). The value of Z1 is negative, yet it is highly insignificant
since the t-statistic, t = -0.8212, is smaller in magnitude than the two-sided critical
value at both the 5% and 10% significance levels (t32,.025 = ±2.0369 and t32,.05 =
±1.6939, respectively) with 32 degrees of freedom. According to Dodaro (1993),
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which suggests that the decline in world
coffee price was likely caused by factors other than the increase in Vietnamese
coffee production.
Although simple microeconomics suggests that an increase in supply
causes a decrease in price under inelastic demand (graph 6), one can assume that
the collapse of the ICA was a major factor in the drastic decline in coffee price.
The simple microeconomic concept of price decreasing after a supply curve shifts
to the right does not exactly apply under the existence of market interferences.
The coffee price had been artificially upheld for most of the 20th century by
various versions of the ICA, thus the true equilibrium price of coffee throughout
this period is difficult to predict. This complicates the ability to blame Vietnam
for causing the price drop. It is likely that the decline occurred because the coffee
market was progressing toward the equilibrium that had not been allowed to
naturally occur in nearly a century.
The collapse of the ICA also removed all export quotas. Several countries,
including Vietnam, took advantage of this altered policy and increased their
supply of coffee on the world market. Although Vietnam was a major contributor
to the oversupply of coffee in the international coffee market, it was not the only
country to increase export volume after the restrictions were removed (see graph
5). The insignificant Granger coefficients denote that there is not enough evidence
to conclude that the increase in Vietnamese coffee production caused the decline
in world coffee prices. This result suggests that other coffee producing nations
should not blame Vietnam for the decreased prices. Rather, they can more
accurately attribute the plummeting world prices to a general move of the ICO
composite price toward equilibrium with the newly expanded export volume and
lack of market interferences.
5.2 DID THE DECREASE IN WORLD
VIETNAMESE COFFEE PRODUCTION?

COFFEE PRICES LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN

The t-statistic presented in Appendix B is not significant since this value, t
= 0.0046, is smaller in magnitude than the two-sided critical value at both the 5%
and 10% significance levels (t32,.025 = ±2.0369 and t32,.05 = ±1.6939, respectively)
with 32 degrees of freedom. Following the methodology presented in Dodaro
(1993), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, thus indicating that there is not
enough evidence to conclude that the growth of Y caused the growth of X. This
signifies that the growth in ICO composite price did not influence the growth in
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Vietnamese coffee production. This analysis originally predicted an insignificant
test statistic in the reverse causality analysis due to the fact that the causal pattern
is illogical according to any current economic theories. The value of Z2 in this
hypothesis test is positive, yet this is of no concern, as it is highly insignificant.
Therefore, the original hypothesis of insignificant reverse causality is supported.
Although this pattern of causality is not significant, it is important to
determine the reasons behind Vietnam’s continuously increasing coffee export
volume throughout this period of consistent declines in the ICO composite price.
A factor in this unique pattern could be the existence of a lag between planting
new trees and the actual increase in coffee production (Ponte, 2001). If the
Vietnamese began planting more trees in the year of the ICA collapse, there
would be a three-year gap before any drastic production increases would be seen
in the export market. This could discourage continued increases in production
since the country would have received low prices for its initial crop of expanded
coffee exports.
However, the Vietnamese export rates increased immediately after this
collapse since the ICA’s quotas regulated only the amount of coffee exported (see
graph 1), which suggests that the initial increases in production occurred prior to
the ICA collapse. Vietnam had access to an unregulated coffee market for the first
time since small farm coffee production began in Vietnam, and thus had the
opportunity to export any excess stored green coffee that had been restricted
under the ICA. However, the fact that the export rates increased so drastically
even after the price began to drop in 1995 suggests the existence of another reason
behind the Vietnamese government’s continued concentration of land and labor
on a commodity with plummeting world prices.
5.3 POST-ICA GRANGER CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
Under the reign of the ICA, Vietnam’s coffee export volume faced strict
regulation and nearly all coffee demand was fulfilled by exports from ICA
member countries. The existence of this quota system produced a Vietnamese
export volume that underrepresented the country’s coffee supply. Similarly, the
ICA artificially upheld the price, which would limit any causality between
Vietnamese coffee production and ICO composite price during the reign of the
ICA since the price was not allowed to move freely. In order to test for the casual
relationship under a relatively open market, a post-ICA Granger causality analysis
was conducted. The methodology and hypothesis testing correspond to the
methods used in the previous Granger analyses; however, the data set in the
regression only includes price and export data since 1990.
Although Vietnam’s export volume increased while the ICO composite
price simultaneously decreased, this post-ICA analysis demonstrates insignificant
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forward and reverse causality (t9,.05=-1.8331 < t = 0.404 < t9,.95= 1.8331; and
t9,.05=-1.8331 < t = 0.889 < t9,.95 = 1.8331, respectively; see appendix C). By
failing to reject the null hypothesis test in both of these regressions, there is not
enough evidence to conclude that the increased coffee production in Vietnam
after the collapse of the ICA caused the decreased ICO composite price.
Therefore, Vietnam does not hold a significant causal role in the decreasing ICO
composite prices under ICA regulation or in an open market.
5.4 DID VIETNAM HAVE HIGHER LABOR PRODUCTIVITY THAN
COFFEE SECTOR?

COLOMBIA

IN THE

Despite Vietnam’s lack of causality in the declining world coffee prices,
the unexpected shift of coffee production from Colombia to Vietnam provides
motivation to explore the factors behind this new production structure. The
increase in Vietnamese coffee exports negatively impacted the Colombian
economy by removing a portion of its coffee export volume, which was the main
source of its export revenue at the time.
The labor productivity calculations display Colombia’s consistently higher
labor productivity over time (see Appendix D.1 and D.2). Although Vietnam’s
labor productivity presents a general increasing trend, it does not approach a
comparable level to Colombia’s labor productivity. The extreme disparity
between the two nations’ productivity raises concern regarding the validity of the
proxy used in these calculations. The proxy used, Agriculture Value Added per
worker, is likely to be partially representative of the coffee sector since this sector
comprises a large share of agriculture in both economies (see graphs 8a and 8b).
However, this measure is calculated by dividing output by the total number of
workers in that sector, wherein the problem lies. As previously discussed, migrant
workers harvest most of the Colombian coffee, and these workers are unlikely to
be accounted for in any measure of employment in these coffee sectors.
This concern is further validated by the data on the percentage of labor
force employed in the Colombian agricultural sector from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (2006) (see graph 9). This percentage is
approximately 1% for two decades, and then jumps up to 20% in the early 2000s.
Based on the history of the Colombian coffee sector, this drastic gap is illogical
given that the country focused more on coffee and agriculture before 2000.
The World Bank’s (2006) data on the percentage of labor force employed
in the Vietnamese agricultural sector is likely to be more accurate due to the
government’s motivating measures that encouraged the production of coffee. The
government’s involvement in coffee production increases the probability that the
government created more accurate statistical measures that are used to monitor
the coffee sector. More accurate statistical methods would identify a greater
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number of laborers in the production of crops, which in turn would lower the
labor productivity value since the output would be spread over a larger number of
workers.
Furthermore, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(2006), the majority of Vietnam’s population is employed in the agriculture sector
(see graph 9). This large percentage of agricultural workers could reduce the
accuracy of using the Agriculture Value Added per worker as a proxy for the
Vietnamese coffee sector. The majority of Vietnam’s citizens are working to
produce some type of agricultural crop, thus it is possible that the productivity of
the less efficient crops is affecting the labor productivity measure of the more
efficient crops, such as coffee and rice. Other agricultural crops that require a
higher amount of labor per unit output may reduce the overall agriculture value
added per worker. Without accounting for the differences in number of workers
and output among Vietnam’s crops, it is impossible to determine if the proxy is
applying a downward bias to the labor productivity calculations. A downward
bias, in this case, would suggest higher actual labor productivity for the coffee
sector through either a higher output or lower number of workers than is indicated
by the proxy. In the future, labor productivity should be calculated using data
specific to the coffee industry in order to avoid the described limitations.
Despite Colombia’s consistently higher labor productivity, Vietnam’s
labor productivity displays a comparatively steady pattern of positive growth after
the collapse of the ICA (see Appendices D.3 and D.4). Although this growth did
not significantly narrow the gap between Vietnamese and Colombian labor
productivity levels, labor productivity growth indicates that output was
reallocated to the more productive producers (Ferreira & Rossi, 2003). Following
this logic, Vietnam may have been attracting production away from Colombia
even though Colombia had higher absolute labor productivity. From Appendix
D.4, it can be seen that Colombia did not have any periods of steady positive
growth, which supports the idea that output could transfer to the more productive
producer. However, Vietnam also experienced volatility in productivity, although
slight in comparison to Colombia, thus, one cannot firmly conclude that
differences in labor productivity growth resulted in the transference of output
from Colombia to Vietnam.
5.5 DOES THE CLASSICAL
EXPORT MARKET?

MODEL ACCURATELY PREDICT THE CONTROLLER OF THE

The comparison of the ratio of labor productivities between Vietnam and
Colombia to the ratio of wages between these two countries produces results
contrary to the original prediction. According to MacDougall (1951, as cited in
Appleyard et al., 2008), the ratio of labor productivities should be larger than the
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ratio of wages in order for Vietnam to dominate the coffee export market.
However, the table in Appendix E indicates that the labor productivity ratio has
been consistently smaller than the wage ratio since 1985, which suggests that
Colombia should dominate the export market.
This analysis also utilized Agriculture Value Added per worker as a proxy
for labor productivity. The lack of accurate worker counts and the lack of
differentiation between agricultural subsectors complicates the ability to claim
accuracy for this proxy. The Prices Paid to Producers remains a fairly accurate
method to estimate wages since it describes the typical income received per
producer on each coffee farm. Overall, the inability to examine the Value Added
Per Worker in the coffee sector severely limits the accuracy of this comparison.
However, the general decreasing trend in the difference between the ratios
supports Vietnam’s continued increase in export market share (see Appendix E).
Thus, if this analysis is repeated in the future using strictly coffee value added, it
is likely that the Classical Model could correctly predict Vietnam’s export market
dominance over Colombia.
5.6 DOES
SHARE?

COST COMPETITIVENESS DETERMINE A COUNTRY’S EXPORT MARKET

The OLS econometric model examined the relationship between a
country’s cost competitiveness (RULC) and its export market share. Specifically,
the model tested for the role, if any, that cost competitiveness had in determining
export market share. Both the Colombian regression and test of significance of the
model produced insignificant results. There is not enough evidence to conclude
that the elasticity of Colombia’s coffee export market share (log(XMS)) is
impacted by the elasticity of cost competitiveness (log(RULC)) in the coffee
sector. The model utilized several data proxies, indicating that the insignificant
results could be influenced by a non-representative proxy. Moreover, the concerns
regarding the labor productivity calculations also apply to this analysis as labor
productivity (eQ/N) is a term in the regression model. This econometric model
does not control for any country-specific factors, so it is highly probable that other
factors are influencing the coefficients of the RULC terms.
This regression did not produce a significant result, hence it cannot be
claimed that the relative cost competitiveness is a major determinant in
Colombia’s coffee export share. However, the notable limitations could severely
bias the results of this analysis. As mentioned, the lack of a significant
relationship between RULC and XMS in Colombia is likely to be a result of poor
data and unrepresentative proxies. After the initial impact of the coffee price
crisis, the Colombian government encouraged diversification among crops. The
use of Agriculture Value Added per worker as a measure of labor productivity
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could bias the RULC calculations since these workers would still be in the
agricultural sector, but not in the coffee realm.
Secondly, the increased prevalence in the Colombia drug trade post-ICA
initiated the calculation of several inaccurate statistics due to the existence of a
“black market” on which this trade occurs (see graph 10). Many workers may
have switched to this other “cash crop” in hopes to regain their livelihood, yet this
switch could have resulted in an inaccurate measure of the agriculture labor force.
Although this is merely a conjecture, it is possible that these two factors
contributed to the relatively stable RULC in the agriculture sector and minimized
the appearance of any shifts in the coffee sector’s RULC. However, the fact that
the RULC and labor productivity measures are fairly consistent over time
suggests that the ICA collapse explains Colombia’s drop in export market share
(see graph 1).
Contrarily, the OLS regression produced significant results at the 0.05
level for Vietnam. The significance implies that the elasticity in cost
competitiveness (log(RULC)) significantly influences the elasticity of Vietnam’s
export market share (log(XMS)). Two of the estimated coefficients are negative,
which produces a negative relationship between log(XMS) and the sum of
log(RULCk). As described in Carlin et al. (2001), these expected negative values
show the negative effects of cost on market share in the long run. Specifically,
since cost competitiveness is measured in relative terms (RULC), when the cost
of production increases in Colombia, all other things equal, Vietnam experiences
a drop in RULC, and thus an increase in market share.
Assuming that the model is correctly specified, it can be concluded that
the Vietnamese export market share is moderately influenced by its relative unit
labor costs in agriculture (R2=0.4358). After the collapse of the ICA, Vietnam
realized its full competitiveness in the coffee market, which had been minimized
by the ICA’s quota system. Graphs 11a and 11b display Colombia’s fairly stable
relative unit labor costs over time, while Vietnam portrays a decreasing trend.
This trend indicates that the Vietnamese agricultural unit labor cost decreased
relative to the Colombian unit labor costs. According to Carlin et al. (2001), this
drop in relative cost – a decline in external competition – resulted in immediate
improvement in Vietnam’s export market share (in tonnes), which is portrayed in
graph 1.
The RULC measure represents each nation’s cost competitiveness in the
coffee market. This measure is similar to comparative advantage in that it
measures the relative cost for each country to produce coffee. Comparative
advantage tends to be a fairly stable statistic for a country over time; however,
Vietnam is a unique case. Vietnam’s coffee exports were limited in the world
market until after the ICA collapse, which is when its relative cost
competitiveness in the coffee sector could be realized for the first time. Although
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the Vietnamese regression indicates a moderate relationship between RULC and
export market share, it cannot be concluded that Vietnam’s realized comparative
advantage explains the shift in coffee production from Colombia to Vietnam.
Colombia’s export market share falls markedly after the ICA collapse (see graph
1), yet its relative unit labor costs remain fairly stable. This observation supports
the insignificant regression results for Colombia (R2=0.0624).
Although no strong conclusions can be made from this cost
competitiveness analysis, the fact that Vietnam’s unit labor costs relative to
Colombia produced a decreasing trend while its export market share increased
indicates that under the realization of free trade some output may have initially
transferred between countries. However, the fact that Colombia did not display
the opposite pattern of increasing RULC with decreasing export market share
complicates the ability to claim that realized relative unit labor costs explained the
shift in production.
6. CONCLUSION

The coffee plant has existed in Colombia and Vietnam for nearly two
hundred years, yet these two countries experienced vastly different economic
impacts and trends in their respective coffee sectors. Specifically, Colombia was a
member of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), thus its coffee sector
flourished throughout the 1900s due to appropriate import demand and artificially
stabilized world coffee prices. Vietnam, however, was not a member of the ICA,
which resulted in a narrow market and limited coffee export volume. After the
collapse of the ICA in 1989, these two countries interacted for the first time in the
international coffee market.
Upon receiving unhindered access to the international market, Vietnam
increased its previously insignificant coffee exports and overtook Colombia’s
share of the coffee export market. This unprecedented increase shocked the
world’s coffee producing nations as Vietnam had held only minimal portions of
the world market prior to the collapse. As a result of the rapid increases in export
volumes from all producing nations, oversupply was created in the world market,
which imposed detrimental impacts upon the nations whose economies relied
heavily on coffee export revenue, such as Colombia.
This paper conducted three main analyses to examine Vietnam’s role in
the international coffee market: a Granger causality analysis, labor productivity
comparisons, and the influence of cost competitiveness on the country’s export
market share. The Granger causality analysis did not produce significant results
for forward, reverse, or post-ICA causality. The original hypothesis, which
predicted significant forward causality, led to insignificant results, suggesting that
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there is not enough evidence to conclude that the increased exports caused the
drop in world prices, thus the original hypothesis is not supported.
The labor productivity of each country’s coffee sector was calculated in
order to compare the countries’ comparative advantages in coffee production. The
original hypothesis predicted that Vietnam would have higher labor productivity
than Colombia, which would motivate trade partners to prefer trade with Vietnam
to Colombia due to the existence of greater potential gains. Labor productivity,
and thus comparative advantage, is a relatively stable measure over time;
however, Vietnam’s comparative advantage was effectively barred from the
international coffee market during the reign of the ICA. The realization of
Vietnam’s comparative advantage post-ICA was predicted to explain the shift in
export volume from Colombia to Vietnam.
The labor productivity comparisons displayed Colombia’s consistently
higher labor productivity in the coffee sector, thus providing no support for the
original hypothesis. By examining annual labor productivity growth, results
demonstrated that Vietnam had increasing and less volatile trends in labor
productivity, yet this is not enough to conclude the significance of comparative
advantage in explaining the shift in export volume between countries. The
Classical Model’s comparison of the labor productivity ratio to the wage ratio also
presented results contrary to the original hypothesis.
Similarly, the analysis of the influence of cost competitiveness on export
market share did not provide the anticipated results. Although this regression
produced significant results for Vietnam (F = 3.60, p = 0.0406, R2 = 0.4358), the
lack of significant Colombian results indicates that no strong conclusions can be
made regarding the role that relative unit labor costs hold in determining the shift
of coffee exports from Colombia to Vietnam. Thus, it can be concluded that the
original hypothesis regarding labor productivity’s role in explaining the transfer
of coffee export volume is not supported.
Although no significant or predicted results were obtained in this paper,
the Classical Model displayed trends toward explaining the observed shift in
world coffee exports. In the future, heeding the limitations discussed, it is likely
that an analysis examining the true labor productivity of the Colombian and
Vietnamese coffee sectors would produce results from the Classical Model that
correspond to the events observed in reality.
Without further research, no conclusions can be made regarding
Vietnam’s role in the world coffee market. During the reign of the ICA,
Vietnam’s coffee production comprised a miniscule portion of its export revenue,
thus coffee was considered relatively unimportant to the country. However, the
government provided incentives in the late 1970s that motivated citizens to
increase the coffee production (Doutriaux et al., 2008). The government,
previously communist, also progressed toward a market-based coffee sector,
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which further encouraged the production of coffee on small farms (Doutriaux et
al., 2008). To accompany this increased production and shift toward a market
based economy, the ICA collapsed in 1989, thus placing Vietnam in the prime
position to take advantage of the newly opened market.
After escaping from the rigidities of a centrally-planned economy, many
more coffee importing nations were willing to engage in trade with Vietnam.
Specifically, Vietnam became a member of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
and signed the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in December 2001, which
led to significantly more changes in Vietnam’s trade regime (The Central
Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2009). The culmination of these three main events –
government encouraged market-based coffee production, the collapse of the ICA,
and the increased willingness of other nations to trade with this no longer
communist country – placed Vietnam in the right place at the right time. Although
it cannot be determined, it is likely that this coincidence is what truly explains the
reason behind Vietnam’s unique drastic increase in world coffee exports.
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Graph 3.
(a)
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(b)
Vietnam: Coffee Share of Total Merchandise Exports
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Graph 4.
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Graph 5.
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Graph 7.
Comparative Advantage Example
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According to this example of comparative advantage, both Colombia and
Vietnam have a comparative advantage in the production of coffee over the
United States. Although Colombia and Vietnam both have absolute advantage in
the production of coffee and all other commodities (assuming this example is
correct), the two trading partners, in both scenarios, stand to gain from trade if
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they each specialize in the good that they can produce with the lowest opportunity
cost. In comparing these two scenarios, the United States has a better chance to
gain from trade by trading with Vietnam, because “the closer the terms of trade
are to a country’s internal autarky price ratio, the smaller the gain for that country
from international trade” (Appleyard et al., 2008, p. 32). If the United States
traded with Colombia, the terms of trade would fall between Colombia’s autarky
price ratio, 1/3, and the United States’ autarky price ratio, ½. If the United States
traded with Vietnam, the terms of trade would fall between Vietnam’s autarky
price ratio, 1/5, and the United States’ autarky price ratio, ½. The second case is a
larger interval in which the terms of trade could fall, thus the United States has a
greater chance of gaining more from trade by trading with Vietnam. If this
example were correct in reality, then the United States, and any other coffee
importing nation, would choose to import coffee from Vietnam over Colombia
after the collapse of the ICA due to the potential for greater gains from trade.
Specifically, if Vietnam had originally been barricaded from participation
in international trade, upon gaining access to the market, many nations would
choose to trade with Vietnam over Colombia since Vietnam’s comparative
advantage offers greater potential gains from trade. Neither country’s comparative
advantage would change over time; however, it is only after the removal of trade
barriers that potential trade partners could realize the disparity between
Vietnamese and Colombian comparative advantage. This newly realized disparity
would motivate importing countries to shift from Colombia to Vietnam in order to
conduct their coffee trade transactions.
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Graph 8.
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Graph 9.
Published Data for Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture
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Graph 10.
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Graph 11.
(a)
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Appendix A
Causality from Vietnamese coffee exportation to ICO Composite Price
A.1 Granger Causality Data
X=Vietnam Coffee Exports (000US$); Y=ICO Composite Price
Vietnamese Coffee Export Volume and ICO Composite Price
Year

(Yt-Yt-1)
Yt-1

(Yt-1-Yt-2)
Yt-2

1968

-0.4859

-0.0446

1.1232

0.0038

-0.0603

-0.0188

1969

0.1920

-0.4859

-0.0446

0.0361

0.0038

-0.0603

1970

0.1858

0.1920

-0.4859

0.3051

0.0361

0.0038

1971

-0.1567

0.1858

0.1920

-0.1160

0.3051

0.0361

1972

0.0389

-0.1567

0.1858

0.1288

-0.1160

0.3051

1973

1.7538

0.0389

-0.1567

0.2331

0.1288

-0.1160

1974

0.0517

1.7538

0.0389

0.0931

0.2331

0.1288

1975

-0.0588

0.0517

1.7538

0.0556

0.0931

0.2331

1976

2.7500

-0.0588

0.0517

0.9791

0.0556

0.0931

1977

-0.5833

2.7500

-0.0588

0.6146

0.9791

0.0556

1978

-0.1000

-0.5833

2.7500

-0.3231

0.6146

0.9791

1979

-0.2889

-0.1000

-0.5833

0.0925

-0.3231

0.6146

1980

0.5100

-0.2889

-0.1000

-0.1111

0.0925

-0.3231

1981

-0.3171

0.5100

-0.2889

-0.2340

-0.1111

0.0925

1982

0.3636

-0.3171

0.5100

0.0830

-0.2340

-0.1111

1983

0.1111

0.3636

-0.3171

0.0238

0.0830

-0.2340

1984

0.1600

0.1111

0.3636

0.1032

0.0238

0.0830

1985

1.3793

0.1600

0.1111

-0.0573

0.1032

0.0238

1986

3.4546

1.3793

0.1600

0.2842

-0.0573

0.1032

1987

-0.1865

3.4546

1.3793

-0.3693

0.2842

-0.0573

1988

0.1609

-0.1865

3.4546

0.0756

-0.3693

0.2842

1989

0.3953

0.1609

-0.1865

-0.2095

0.0756

-0.3693

1990

0.1418

0.3953

0.1609

-0.2197

-0.2095

0.0756

1991

-0.1756

0.1418

0.3953

-0.0661

-0.2197

-0.2095
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1992

0.1999

-0.1756

0.1418

-0.2013

-0.0661

-0.2197

1993

0.2132

0.1999

-0.1756

0.1552

-0.2013

-0.0661

1994

1.9550

0.2132

0.1999

1.1816

0.1552

-0.2013

1995

0.8171

1.9550

0.2132

0.0295

1.1816

0.1552

1996

-0.2953

0.8171

1.9550

-0.2626

0.0295

1.1816

1997

0.1846

-0.2953

0.8171

0.3119

-0.2626

0.0295

1998

0.1935

0.1846

-0.2953

-0.1864

0.3119

-0.2626

1999

-0.0150

0.1935

0.1846

-0.2133

-0.1864

0.3119

2000

-0.1458

-0.0150

0.1935

-0.2505

-0.2133

-0.1864

2001

-0.2168

-0.1458

-0.0150

-0.2903

-0.2505

-0.2133

2002

-0.1764

-0.2168

-0.1458

0.0472

-0.2903

-0.2505

2003

0.5665

-0.1764

-0.2168

0.0871

0.0472

-0.2903

2004

0.2696

0.5665

-0.1764

0.1975

0.0871

0.0472

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; International Coffee Organization
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A.2 STATA Robust OLS Regression
. regress GICOprice GICOprice_lag1 GICOprice_lag2 GVietnamexport_lag1
GVietnamexport_lag2, robust
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2
Linear regression
Number of obs =

37
F( 4, 32) = 0.60
b > F = 0.6678
R-squared = 0.0563
Root MSE = .33662

GICOprice

Coef.

GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
_cons

.1669969
-.0477248
-.0242984
-.0627301
.0789892

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

.1898713
.1663265
.0782956
.0621745
.064487

0.88
-0.29
-0.31
-1.01
1.22

0.386
0.776
0.758
0.321
0.230

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.2197583
-.3865208
-.1837813
-.1893754
-.0523664

.553752
.2910712
.1351845
.0639152
.2103448

A.3 STATA Variance and Covariance Calculations for Use in T-Test
. correlate, _coef cov
GICOpr~1
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
_cons

.036051
-.002708
-.007945
-.000996
.005194

GICOpr~2

.027665
-.00117
-.005373
-.001993

GVietn~1

GVietn~2

.00613
.000617
-.002537

.003866
-.00093

_cons

.004159

A.4 Computations
Z1 = b1+b2 = 0

where se(



–0
-.0242984 - .0627301
t = __________________ = ____________________________ = -0.8212
se(
)
.1059716943

) = [Var
]1/2 = [Var(
+ 2cov
+ Var
]1/2
1/2
1/2
= [.00613 + 2(.000617) + .003866] = [.01123] = .1059716943
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Appendix B
Causality from ICO Composite Price to Vietnamese coffee exportation
B.1 Granger Causality Data
See above data in appendix A.1. X=Vietnam Coffee Exports (000US$); Y=ICO
Composite Price
B.2 STATA Robust OLS Regression
GXt = α + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2
. regress GVietnamexport GVietnamexport_lag1 GVietnamexport_lag2 GICOprice_lag1
GICOprice_lag2, robust
Linear regression
Number of obs =

37
F( 4, 32) = 1.84
Prob > F = 0.1462
R-squared = 0.0372
Root MSE = .89822

GVietnamex~t
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
_cons

Coef.
-.0487753
-.1157751
.2404705
-.2381764
.4038822

Robust
Std. Err.
.253131
.1230982
.5481534
.3369078
.1526087

t

P>|t|

-0.19
-0.94
0.44
-0.71
2.65

0.848
0.354
0.664
0.485
0.013

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.5643863
-.3665179
-.8760815
-.9244353
.0930283

.4668357
.1349677
1.357022
.4480824
.714736

B.3 STATA Variance and Covariance Calculations for Use in T-Test
. correlate, _coef cov

GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
_cons

GVietn~1

GVietn~2

GICOpr~1

GICOpr~2

.064075
-.008417
-.105933
.031696
.001071

.015153
.017175
-.03354
-.010886

.300472
-.084761
-.005517

.113507
.013121
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B.4 Computations
Z2 = d1+d2 = 0

where se(



–0
.2404705 - .2381764
t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.0046
)
.4944259297
se(

) = [Var
]1/2 = [Var(
+ 2cov
+ Var
]1/2
1/2
1/2
= [.300472 + 2(-.084761) + .113507] = [.244457] = .4944259297
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Appendix C
Post-ICA Granger Causality Analysis
C.1 Causality from Vietnamese Coffee Exportation to ICO Composite Price
. regress GICOprice GICOprice_lag1 GICOprice_lag2 GVietnamexport_lag1
GVietnamexport_lag2, robust
GYt = α + a1GYt-1 + a2GYt-2 + b1GXt-1 + b2GXt-2
Linear regression
Number of obs =

14
F( 4, 9) = 0.53
Prob > F = 0.7153
R-squared = 0.1097
Root MSE = .4321

Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

.2575647
-.5282056
-.0350061
.2420801
-.0153595

.6395155
.5715245
.4148301
.3479887
.1423496

0.40
-0.92
-0.08
0.70
-0.11

0.697
0.379
0.935
0.504
0.916

GICOprice
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
_cons

[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.18912
-1.821084
-.9734171
-.5451251
-.3373767

1.704249
.7646727
.9034048
1.029285
.3066577

. correlate, _coef cov
GICOpr~1

GICOpr~2

GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
_cons

.40898
-.004973
-.248742
.066369
.066713

.32664
-.049814
-.183647
.014505

Computations:
Z1 = b1+b2 = 0



where se(

GVietn~1

.172084
-.015169
-.044778

GVietn~2

_cons

.121096
-.002591

.020263

–0
-.0350061 + .2420801
t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.404
se(
)
.51268

) = [Var
]1/2 = [Var(
+ 2cov
+ Var
]1/2
1/2
1/2
= [.172084 + 2(-.015169) + .121096] = [.262842] = .51268
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C.2 Causality from ICO Composite Price to Vietnamese Coffee Exportation
GXt = α + c1GXt-1 + c2GXt-2 + d1GYt-1 + d2GYt-2
. regress GVietnamexport GVietnamexport_lag1 GVietnamexport_lag2 GICOprice_lag1
GICOprice_lag2, robust
Linear regression
Number of obs =

14
F( 4, 9) = 3.02
Prob > F = 0.0779
R-squared = 0.3698
Root MSE = .55783

GVietnamex~t

Coef.

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
_cons

-.4827336
.1804349
1.443071
-.4213448
.2954999

.5417448
.4431983
.8619732
.7615072
.2047185

-0.89
0.41
1.67
-0.55
1.44

0.396
0.693
0.128
0.594
0.183

[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.708246
-.8221493
-.5068483
-2.143994
-.1676055

.7427783
1.183019
3.392989
1.301304
.7586053

. correlate, _coef cov
GVietn~1
GVietnamex~1
GVietnamex~2
GICOprice_~1
GICOprice_~2
_cons

.293487
.00677
-.437533
-.110164
-.094504

GVietn~2

.196425
.087477
-.320654
-.010211

GICOpr~1

.742998
-.000417
.14288

GICOpr~2

.579893
.036703

_cons

.04191

Computations:
Z2 = d1+d2 = 0

where se(



–0
1.443071 - .4213448
t = __________________ = ____________________________ = 0.8886
)
1.149807375
se(

) = [Var
]1/2 = [Var(
+ 2cov
+ Var
]1/2
1/2
1/2
= [.742998 + 2(-.000417) + .579893] = [1.322057] = 1.149807375
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Appendix D
D.1 Labor Productivity Data
Colombian and Vietnamese Labor Productivity

Year

Colombia
Agriculture Value Added
per worker (constant 2000 US$)

Vietnam
Agriculture Value Added
per worker (constant 2000 US$)

1985

2599.908048

209.0801699

1986

2693.270866

209.9914798

1987

2877.770331

202.4222486

1988

2975.278818

204.6078737

1989

3127.260605

213.5519233

1990

3341.260745

210.4735516

1991

3472.545684

210.9842621

1992

3400.703724

221.3623725

1993

3504.185806

224.6287443

1994

2715.617769

228.4288468

1995

2814.725835

235.8577393

1996

2778.466324

242.9699018

1997

2796.528905

250.3177672

1998

2799.114023

256.4708048

1999

2800.786246

267.0655904

2000

2688.187007

276.5320571

2001

2683.187007

281.1130901

2002

2695.126453

289.0702896

2003

2779.228029

295.7341886

2004

2847.460843

304.7876375

2005

2913.932274

313.2078420

Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators
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D.2 Graphical Comparison of Labor Productivity
Labor Productivity
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D.3 Labor Productivity Growth
Growth in Labor Productivity in Colombia and Vietnam

Year*

Colombia
Growth in Agriculture
Value Added per worker (%)

Vietnam
Growth in Agriculture
Value Added per worker (%)

1985

3.591004587

0.435866241

1986

6.850386573

-3.60454203

1987

3.388334548

1.079735602

1988

5.108152754

4.371312545

1989

6.843054262

-1.441509705

1990

3.929203665

0.242648294

1991

-2.068855719

4.918902595

1992

3.042960829

1.475576788

1993

-22.50360229

1.691725839

1994

3.649558759

3.252169152

1995

-1.288207561

3.015445896

1996

0.650091757

3.024187511

1997

0.092440246

2.458090647

1998

0.059741167

4.130990896

1999

-4.018268758

3.544622391

2000

-0.188082727

1.656601074

2001

0.444972565

2.830604388

2002

3.120505772

2.305286717

2003

2.455099515

3.061346726

2004

2.334410706

2.762646328

Source: The World Bank Group World Development Indicators
* Each year represents the growth between the stated year and the following year [e.g.(xt–xt-1)/xt-1)
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D.4 Graphical Comparison of Labor Productivity Growth
Growth in Labor Productivity
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Appendix E
Classical Model Analysis
Labor ProductivityVietnam
____________________________________
Labor ProductivityColombia

>

wVietnam
_____________
wColombia

Labor Productivity and Wage Determination of Export Market Domination
Year
1985

(A)
Labor ProductivityVietnam
Labor ProductivityColombia
0.08041829

(B)
wageVietnam
wageColombia
1.46884565

_

(A) – (B)*
-1.3895274

1986

0.07796894

1.09447939

-1.0165105

1987

0.07033996

2.00225494

-1.9319150

1988

0.06876831

0.93628639

-0.8675171

1989

0.06828722

0.73640977

-0.6681226

1990

0.06299226

0.67586777

-0.6128755

1991

0.06075781

0.54562270

-0.4848649

1992

0.06509311

0.56538585

-0.5002927

1993

0.06410298

0.69234222

-0.6282392

1994

0.08411672

0.96420716

-0.8800904

1995

0.08379421

0.95637765

-0.8725834

1996

0.08744749

0.61912832

-0.5316808

1997

0.08951017

0.42436382

-0.3348537

1998

0.09162571

0.64350399

-0.5518783

1999

0.09535379

0.58670654

-0.4913527

2000

0.10286721

0.35410784

-0.2512406

2001

0.10476836

0.26172754

-0.1569592

2002

0.10725667

0.34603891

-0.2387822

2003

0.10640875

0.57754564

-0.4711369

2004

0.10703839

0.42801956

-0.3209812

2005

0.10748631

0.40235373

-0.294867

Source: The World Bank Group’s World Development Indicators, International Coffee
Organization
*Note: the negative values of (A) – (B) indicate that Colombia, not Vietnam, should dominate the
world coffee export market.
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Appendix F
Cost Competitiveness for Vietnam
F.1 Data Components of the regression equation
XMS and RULC Data

Year

XMS

W/E

eQ/N

ULC

RULC

1985

0.00127518

91.5016667

209.08017

19131.18401

0.76134937

1986

0.004221

95.5416667

209.99148

20062.93596

0.55521666

1987

0.00510277

156.87

202.422249

31753.97814

0.90072028

1988

0.00583884

70.1575

204.607874

14354.77690

0.42178983

1989

0.00896637

54.5366667

213.551923

11646.41006

0.33090394

1990

0.01320452

46.9908333

210.473552

9890.327586

0.28084221

1991

0.01150466

36.6258333

210.984262

7727.474420

0.21934086

1992

0.01707245

30.8875

221.362372

6837.330280

0.24321829

1993

0.01918129

34.7025

224.628744

7795.178997

0.29259136

1994

0.030418129

82.9258333

228.428847

18942.65248

0.52849920

1995

0.04850753

94.7483333

235.857739

22347.12770

0.52235757

1996

0.040351

57.84

242.969902

14053.37912

0.35582551

1997

0.03766655

55.8791667

250.317767

13987.54823

0.25093570

1998

0.0496488

65.6116667

256.470805

16827.47696

0.38691074

1999

0.0597665

50.6816667

267.065590

13535.32923

0.36746700

2000

0.05905979

26.5433333

276.532057

7340.082570

0.24075827

2001

0.07199897

15.12

281.113090

4250.429923

0.18176238

2002

0.06336321

18.1416667

289.070290

5244.216838

0.24525737

2003

0.08840501

27.92

295.734189

8256.898546

0.40295929

2004

0.09045975

26.0375

304.787638

7935.908112

0.30190247

Sources: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development
Indicators, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department
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F.2 STATA Regression Results for Vietnam
Specific Regression Model:
log(XMS) = α1log(RULCt) + α2log(RULCt-1) + α3log(RULCt-2) + vk
. regress logXMSv logRULCv logRULCv_lag1 logRULCv_lag2

Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

6.37444653
8.25265828

3
14

2.12481551
.589475591

Total

14.6271048

17

.86041793

logXMSv
logRULCv
logRULCv_lag1
logRULCv_lag2
_cons

Coef.

Std. Err.

-.5304175
.1262881
-1.295814
-5.330354

.579216
.6737602
.5300737
.6569586

t
-0.92
0.19
-2.44
-8.11

Number of obs =
18
F( 3, 14) = 3.60
Prob > F = 0.0406
R-squared = 0.4358
Adj R-squared = 0.3149
Root MSE = .76777

P>|t|
0.375
0.854
0.028
0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.772712 .7118773
-1.318784
1.57136
-2.432709 -.1589188
-6.73939 -3.921318

. test (logRULCv=0) (logRULCv_lag1=0) (logRULCv_lag2=0)
( 1) logRULCv = 0
( 2) logRULCv_lag1 = 0
( 3) logRULCv_lag2 = 0
F( 3, 14) = 3.60
Prob > F = 0.0406

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2010

53

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 6 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Appendix G
Cost Competitiveness for Colombia
G.1 Data Components of the regression equation
XMS and RULC Data

Year

XMS

1985

0.16129366

1986

W/E

eQ/N

ULC

RULC

62.2483333

2599.90805

161839.9428

6.44062271

0.20518667

87.2941667

2693.28087

235106.8358

6.50745953

1987

0.16843407

78.3466667

2877.77033

225463.7129

6.39541090

1988

0.16501347

74.9316667

2975.27882

222942.6006

6.55077552

1989

0.16869129

74.0575

3127.26060

231597.1022

6.58025883

1990

0.20196961

69.5266667

3341.26074

232306.7220

6.59649880

1991

0.20163903

67.1266667

3472.54568

233100.4166

6.61644979

1992

0.23512948

54.6308333

3400.70372

185783.2784

6.60870397

1993

0.19752966

50.1233333

3504.18581

175641.4732

6.59268739

1994

0.18483909

86.0041667

2715.61777

233554.4432

6.51615909

1995

0.14953039

99.07

2814.72584

278854.8885

6.51815143

1996

0.15152263

93.4216667

2778.46632

259568.9548

6.57217429

1997

0.17106377

131.6775

2796.52890

368239.934

6.60620045

1998

0.15824341

101.96

2799.11402

285397.6658

6.56209027

1999

0.13533032

86.3833333

2800.78625

241941.2519

6.56839780

2000

0.12640059

74.9583333

2688.24313

201506.2244

6.60950200

2001

0.14140649

57.77

2683.18701

155007.7134

6.62864021

2002

0.15360196

52.4266667

2695.12645

141296.4962

6.60804249

2003

0.14212054

48.3425

2779.22803

134354.8310

6.55688413

2004

0.13558858

60.8325

2847.46084

173218.1617

6.58966688

Sources: International Coffee Organization, The World Bank Group World Development
Indicators, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: Statistics Department
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G.2 STATA Regression Results for Colombia
Specific Regression Model:
log(XMS) = α1log(RULCt) + α2log(RULCt-1) + α3log(RULCt-2) + vk
. regress logXMSc logRULCc logRULCc_lag1 logRULCc_lag2
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.02943561
.442382842

3
14

.00981187
.031598774

Total

.471818453

17

.027754027

logXMSc
logRULCc
logRULCc_lag1
logRULCc_lag2
_cons

Number of obs =
18
F( 3, 14) = 0.31
Prob > F = 0.8175
R-squared = 0.0624
Adj R-squared = -0.1385
Root MSE = .17776

Coef.

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

-.4828017
5.62824
-3.455862
-4.991919

5.882221
6.22384
5.228506
11.74741

-0.08
0.90
-0.66
-0.42

0.936
0.381
0.519
0.677

-13.09891 12.13331
-7.72057 18.97705
-14.66989 7.758169
-30.1876 20.20376

. test (logRULCc=0) (logRULCc_lag1=0) (logRULCc_lag2=0)
( 1) logRULCc = 0
( 2) logRULCc_lag1 = 0
( 3) logRULCc_lag2 = 0
F( 3, 14) = 0.31
Prob > F = 0.8175
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